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During the water crisis in Flint, Michigan, USA (2014–2015),
2 outbreaks of Legionnaires’ disease occurred in Genesee
County, Michigan. We compared whole-genome sequences
of 10 clinical Legionella pneumophila isolates submitted to a
laboratory in Genesee County during the second outbreak
with 103 water isolates collected the following year. We
documented a genetically diverse range of L. pneumophila
strains across clinical and water isolates. Isolates belonging to 1 clade (3 clinical isolates, 3 water isolates from a
Flint hospital, 1 water isolate from a Flint residence, and
the reference Paris strain) had a high degree of similarity
(2–1,062 single-nucleotide polymorphisms), all L. pneumophila sequence type 1, serogroup 1. Serogroup 6 isolates belonging to sequence type 2518 were widespread
in Flint hospital water samples but bore no resemblance to
available clinical isolates. L. pneumophila strains in Flint tap
water after the outbreaks were diverse and similar to some
disease-causing strains.

L

egionnaires’ disease is a severe form of pneumonia
caused by inhalation of virulent species of aerosolized
Legionella bacteria. In January 2016, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) and the
Genesee County Health Department publicly announced 2
Legionnaires’ disease outbreaks in Genesee County, Michigan, USA (1,2). The first outbreak occurred from June
2014 through March 2015 and the second from May 2015
through October 2015; a total of 90 cases and 12 deaths
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were documented (1–3). From April 2014 through October 2015, the city of Flint, in Genesee County, switched
its drinking water source from Detroit Water and Sewer
Department (DWSD), which used corrosion control, to
the corrosive Flint River, without implementing federally
mandated corrosion control; this new water source led to
elevated lead in tap water over a prolonged period, now
called the Flint water crisis (4). This disruption in water
quality likely also stimulated the growth of L. pneumophila, the species most frequently identified as the causative
agent of Legionnaires’ disease (5,6), in Flint’s distribution
and plumbing systems (7).
Our prior work associated the Legionnaires’ disease
outbreaks with factors known to be conducive to Legionella growth: elevated iron (a consequence of corroded iron
water mains), reduced free chlorine disinfectant residuals, and elevated water temperatures (7,8). Later, Zahran
and colleagues reported that the odds of Flint residents
being referred for Legionnaires’ disease treatment while
the Flint River was the source of tap water increased 6.3fold and confirmed our report of associations with low
chlorine residuals (9), but the odds analysis, which was
based on the use of referral date rather than symptom onset date, excluded many healthcare-associated cases (10).
Furthermore, during the second outbreak, Legionella
spp. and L. pneumophila genes were found to be higher
in the tap water of large buildings in Flint than in other
water systems in US areas not experiencing outbreaks
(8). Conversely, levels of the mip gene, which is specific
to L. pneumophila, were largely below detection in Flint
single-family residences, at least during the later stages of
the water crisis when they were measured (2015–2016)
(8). Large buildings with extensive plumbing networks,
such as hospitals, are generally more susceptible to Legionella growth than are simpler plumbing systems characteristic of single-family homes (11); however, residences
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are also of interest for Legionella growth, given concerns
about the high rate of sporadic Legionnaires’ disease (12)
and potential for exposure in the home.
Our study objective was to use next-generation DNA
sequencing to compare L. pneumophila isolated from
Flint tap water after the second Legionnaires’ disease
outbreak with tap water isolates from neighboring drinking water systems outside of Flint that were never served
by Flint River water and clinical strains received during
the second outbreak at a regional reference laboratory in
Genesee County. Within Flint, Legionella isolates were
obtained from the tap water of a hospital, a large public building, and single-family residences several months
after the water source was switched back to DWSD. In
addition to serogroup testing, we used whole-genome sequencing to compare isolates in terms of sequence type
(ST), average nucleotide identity, and single-nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs).
Materials and Methods
Water Sample Collection and Legionella Isolation

After Flint resumed purchasing water with corrosion control from the original supplier, DWSD, water sampling
campaigns were conducted 5 months (March 7–9, 2016),
8 months (June 21–27, 2016), and 10 months (August 15–
16, 2016) later. Samples were collected from residences,
small businesses, a large public building, and a hospital in
Flint; as controls, samples were collected from buildings
located outside of Flint that used DWSD or well water
(Table 1). The March 2016 campaign targeted sampling
of residences, small businesses, a large public building,
and a hospital; samples were collected from hot (flushed
for 30 seconds) and cold (stagnant) taps at each location.
Samples were collected from the kitchen sink in homes
and from restrooms in public buildings. The June 2016
campaign extensively sampled homes as part of a water
heater cleaning campaign; the following samples were
collected before and after a cleaning protocol: hot and
cold stagnant kitchen tap samples, a stagnant shower sample of blended hot and cold water, a hot flushed kitchen
tap sample, the water heater drain valve, and a flushed
cold water sample from the outside hose bib or nearest
tap to the service entry point. The August 2016 campaign
targeted sampling from hot (flushed 30 seconds) and cold
(stagnant) water taps from homes and small businesses.
Legionella was cultured according to standard methods
(13), and colonies were streaked to isolation.
Clinical Isolates

MDHHS provided 11 clinical isolates from de-identified
Legionnaires’ patients who received a diagnosis in 2015;
however, 1 isolate could not be cultured and was deemed
2014

nonviable. When we initiated this study, we assumed that
all 11 isolates originated from patients with some history
of exposure in Flint or Genesee County during the Flint
water crisis. However, we later learned that the commonality among clinical isolates was that they had been submitted to a Genesee County laboratory for analysis during
the second outbreak and that 3 of the 11 isolates originated
from patients who resided and received treatment outside
of Genesee County (J. McFadden, MDHHS, pers. comm.,
2017 Feb 1). Because the clinical isolates in this study
were de-identified, comparison with the water isolates is
described in terms of “L. pneumophila known to be capable
of causing LD.” We also included publicly available DNA
sequence information from clinical reference strains in the
analysis (Appendix 1 Table 2, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/
EID/article/25/11/18-1032-App1.pdf).
Whole-Genome Analysis of L. pneumophila Isolates

Whole-genome sequencing was conducted by MicrobesNG
(https://microbesng.uk) on an Illumina MiSeq (https://www.
illumina.com) with 2 × 250-bp paired-end reads and Nextera
library preparation (Illumina). Sequencing was performed
for a representative subset of each building type and water
source, including 103 water isolates and the 10 available clinical L. pneumophila isolates (Appendix 1 Table 1). To verify
DNA integrity, DNA extracts were quantified via a Qubit 2.0
fluorometer (https://www.thermofisher.com) and analyzed
via gel electrophoresis. Positive (L. pneumophila strain 130b)
and negative (Stenotrophomonas maltophilia) control strains
were also sequenced, and 3 clinical strains were sequenced
in duplicate on 2 MiSeq runs to evaluate run-to-run variation
(Appendix 1 Figures 1–3). On average, 806,825 reads were
obtained per isolate (range 280,380–2,031,828 reads). Reads
were trimmed by using Trimmomatic (14), and de novo assemblies were generated by using SPAdes (15).
Genome sequences are available in GenBank under
BioProject PRJNA453403. Legionella species assignments
were determined via blastn (https://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)
for isolate 16S rRNA gene sequences. Average nucleotide
identity was calculated as previously described (16), and
SNPs were identified by using kSNP3.0 (17). We also included 9 L. pneumophila reference strains (Appendix 1 Table 2). We performed sequence-based typing targeting the
flaA, pilE, asd, mip, mompS, proA, and neuA alleles (18) by
using the mompS tool (19).
Serogroup Analysis

We identified L. pneumophila isolates belonging to serogroup 1 via detection of the wzm gene (20) in whole genome
sequences. We verified DNA sequence-based classifications
and determined unknown serogroups by using direct fluorescent antibody staining with fluorescein isothiocyanate–conjugated antibodies (m-TECH, http://www.4m-tech.com).
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Table 1. Total number of buildings sampled, number of samples collected, and number of isolates analyzed for Legionella, Flint,
Michigan, USA*
March 2016
June 2016
August 2016
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
buildings
No. (%)
isolates
buildings
No. (%)
isolates
buildings
No. (%)
isolates
Water sample source or samples positive analyzed
or samples positive analyzed
or samples positive analyzed
5
0
32†
2 (6)
10‡
2 (20)
Flint residences
Hot (flushed)
5
0
0
62
2 (3)
3
14
1 (7)
1
Hot (stagnant)
NS
62
2 (3)
4
NS
Cold (flushed)
NS
61
1 (2)
2
NS
Cold (stagnant)
5
0
0
61
1 (2)
4
11
4 (36)
1
Water heater
NS
62
1 (2)
5
NS
drain valve
Shower (hot and
NS
62
1 (2)
2
3
1 (33)
1
cold)
1
1 (100)
NS
NS
Hospitals
Hot (flushed)
19
16 (84)
56
NS
NS
Cold (stagnant)
19
6 (32)
14
NS
NS
4
0
NS
8
0
Buildings receiving
DWSD water
Hot (flushed)
4
0
0
NS
8
0
0
Cold (stagnant)
4
0
0
NS
8
0
0
2
1 (50)
NS
NS
Flint large buildings
Hot (flushed)
5
0
0
NS
NS
Cold (stagnant)
5
1 (20)
1
NS
NS
1
1 (100)
NS
NS
Buildings receiving
well water
Hot (flushed)
4
4 (100)
5§
NS
NS
Cold (stagnant)
3
2 (67)
4¶
NS
NS
6
0
NS
8
0
Flint small businesses
Hot (flushed)
6
0
0
NS
8
0
0
Cold (stagnant)
6
0
0
NS
8
0
0
*Positive samples indicate presumptive L. pneumophila identified by performing culture according to the method described in (12). Unless otherwise
noted, identification as L. pneumophila was confirmed by using whole-genome sequencing. Boldface indicates total buildings sampled. Blank cells
indicate that data were not reported when applicable samples were not collected. NS, no samples of this type were collected.
†1 of the 32 homes was also sampled in March 2016.
‡5 of the 10 homes were also sampled in March 2016; 1 of the 10 was sampled in June 2016 (but not in March 2016; samples from this house were
positive on both dates).
§4 of 5 isolates were a non–L. pneumophila species, according to whole-genome sequencing.
¶4 of 4 isolates were a non–L. pneumophila species, according to whole-genome sequencing.

Results
Legionella Isolate Characterization

Of the 515 total water samples collected and from which L.
pneumophila isolation was attempted (Table 1), 43 samples
(8%) were positive for Legionella. Of these, 22 (58%) of 38
hospital samples from March 2016, eight (2%) of 370 residence samples from June 2016 (positives originating from
2 separate residences), and 6 (21%) of 28 residence samples from August 2016 (positives originating from different
taps in a single residence) were positive for culturable L.
pneumophila. No isolates were obtained from businesses
receiving DWSD water, but 6 (86%) of 7 taps at the school
serviced by well water were identified as positive (although
5 of these were later determined to be Legionella species
other than L. pneumophila).
16S rRNA genes mined from whole-genome sequences indicated that all clinical and water isolates, except for
8 of the 9 well water isolates, were L. pneumophila. The
positive control strain was correctly identified as L. pneumophila; SNP analysis further classified it according to its
known provenance (130b), and the negative control strain

was also confirmed to be S. maltophilia (i.e., not Legionella). Serogrouping via presence of the wzm gene for serogroup 1 and direct fluorescent antibody staining for other
serogroups indicated that all L. pneumophila isolates belonged to serogroups 1 and 6 (Table 2).
L. pneumophila isolates from clinical and water samples belonged to several STs (Table 2). Of serogroup 1 isolates, all belonged to STs 1, 44, 159, 192, 211, 213, or 222
or to a previously uncharacterized ST that we submitted
to the European Working Group for Legionella Infections
database (http://www.ewgli.org) and that has now been
designated as ST2513. Serogroup 6 isolates all belonged
to a previously uncharacterized ST that has now been
designated as ST2518. Most hospital isolates belonged to
ST2518, and isolates originating from residential tap water
belonged primarily to ST192. Only ST1 was represented
by both clinical and water isolates, specifically, 3 clinical
isolates, 3 isolates from hospital tap water, and 1 isolate
from residential tap water.
When classified according to SNP similarity, isolates
formed distinct clades that were generally consistent with the
ST classification (Figure). The ST1 clade varied by 2–1,062
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Table 2. Summary of Legionalla pneumophila isolates from Flint,
Michigan, USA, 2016
ST
Serogroup
Isolate origin*
1
1
3 hospital water (HH17, HH25, HH56), 1
residence water (RH08), 3 clinical (C2,
C3, C7)
44
1
1 clinical (C6)
159
1
1 clinical (C1)
192
1
19 residence water (RC01, RC02, RC03,
RC04, RC06, RC07, RD01, RD02, RD03,
RD04, RD05, RH02, RH03, RH04, RH05,
RH07 RH07, RS01, RS02)
211
1
1 clinical (C8)
213
1
2 clinical (C4, C5)
222
1
1 clinical (C9)
2513†
1
1 clinical (C10)
2518†
6
66 hospital water (HC01, HC02, HC03,
HC04, HC05, HC06, HC07, HC08, HC09,
HC10, HC11, HC12, HC13, HC14, HH01,
HH02, HH03, HH04, HH05, HH06, HH07,
HH08, HH09, HH10, HH11, HH12, HH13,
HH14, HH15, HH16, HH18, HH19, HH20,
HH21, HH22, HH23, HH24, HH26, HH27,
HH29, HH30, HH31, HH32, HH33, HH34,
HH35, HH36, HH37, HH38, HH39, HH40,
HH41, HH42, HH43, HH44, HH45, HH46,
HH47, HH48, HH49, HH50, HH51, HH52,
HH53, HH54, HH55), 1 public building
(PC01), 1 well water (WH03)
ND
ND
HH28, RC05, RH01, RS03, WC01, WC02,
WC03, WC04, WH01, WH02, WH04,
WH05
*First letter of isolate name indicates building type/location: H, hospital; R,
residence; W, school using well water; P, large public building. Second
letter indicates sample collection location; H, hot water tap; C, cold water
tap; D, water heater drain valve; S, shower. Numerals 1–10 indicate
clinical strains. ND, not determined because of lack of L. pneumophila–
specific alleles or insufficient genome coverage; ST, sequence type.
†New sequence types from this study submitted to European Working
Group for Legionella Infections database (http://www.ewgli.org).

SNPs, and isolates varied from the reference Paris strain
by 371–505 SNPs. In particular, clinical isolate C3 shared
the highest degree of similarity with Flint tap water isolates
(38–46 SNPs). Some degree of variation is expected to be
associated with variability in sequencing accuracy because
the 3 clinical isolates that were sequenced in duplicate on
multiple MiSeq lanes differed from their replicate by 0–10
SNPs. Several other distinct clades emerged in which water
isolates were grouped primarily by building type. A large
clade of ST2518 isolates included most samples from the
hospital, 1 sample from well water, and 1 sample from a
large public building. Another clade contained only isolates
originating from Flint residence water samples belonging to
ST192. The SNP results were confirmed by phylogenetic
analysis and average nucleotide identity comparison (Appendix 1 Figures 1–3; Appendix 2, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/
EID/article/25/11/18-1032-App2.xlsx).
The STs of 8 isolates derived from well water could
not be determined because L. pneumophila–specific alleles
were absent, suggesting that the isolates were mistakenly
phenotypically characterized as L. pneumophila on the
basis of colony morphology. Average nucleotide identity
2016

values comparing these isolates with the positive control
L. pneumophila strain (130b) were 62.645%–62.969%,
whereas average nucleotide identity values of a single species are generally >95% (21). These 8 isolates seem to be
most closely related to L. taurinensis, L. rubrilucens, or L.
erythra, because the 16S rRNA genes extracted from these
genomes shared >99% nt similarity to all 3 species.
Discussion
When considered per capita, the Legionnaires’ outbreaks
in Genesee County are among the largest in US history.
However, to our knowledge, few clinical sputum isolates
were collected or preserved from these outbreaks; for most
cases, only urine-antigen testing was conducted. A common problem in the United States is reliance on urine-antigen testing and lack of collection of clinical Legionella
isolates; these practices unfortunately limit the ability to
track sources of infection, learn from past outbreaks, and
prevent future outbreaks (22,23). Among the clinical sputum isolates that were sent to Genesee County laboratories
during the outbreaks, none were from patients residing in
homes serviced by Flint water (S. Lyon-Callo, MDHHS,
pers. comm., 2018 Apr 5); thus, direct examination of potential residential exposure is not possible from this study.
Given that 68% of patients’ residences were confirmed to
not have been serviced by Flint water (3), the potential exists that a portion of the remaining 32% had some residential exposure in Flint.
Another challenge of tracking sources of Legionnaires’
disease is limited availability of water isolates. Given that
the outbreaks were not publicly announced until 3 months
after the conclusion of the second outbreak (January 2016),
few environmental specimens were collected or preserved
when the outbreaks were occurring. Analysis of any other
water isolates that might exist from the time of the crisis
would be valuable for learning more about this outbreak.
MDHHS reported that 106 environmental Legionella specimens were retained at a Flint hospital but were not submitted to the State Health Department as had been requested
(Sarah Lyon-Callo, MDHHS, pers. comm., 2019 Apr 30).
Thus, a more definitive study of environmental sources of
the outbreaks is not possible without a wider collection of
clinical and environmental isolates.
Our study provides a survey of the landscape of genetic diversity among Legionella isolates collected from
tap water from a range of building types served by the
Flint drinking water distribution system over the 1-year
period after the switch back to DWSD water. We compared these isolates with clinical isolates and with isolates
from tap water of neighboring water systems never served
by the Flint River or DWSD. Although it was not possible to collect water isolates during the actual outbreaks,
previous studies have demonstrated that a single strain of
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Figure. Single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) analysis of isolates from study of Legionella pneumophila in tap water, Flint,
Michigan, USA. Analysis was conducted in kSNP3.0 (https://sourceforge.net/projects/ksnp/) and visualized by using FigTree 14.3
(https://github.com/rambaut/figtree/releases/tag/v1.4.3). Isolate sources: yellow, clinical samples; blue, hospital water; red, residence
water; purple, public building water; green, buildings supplied by well water. With the exception of buildings supplied by well water, all
buildings were serviced by Flint municipal water. Reference strains are detailed in Appendix 1 Table 2 (https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/25/11/18-1032-App1.pdf). Scale bar indicates nucleotide substitutions per site.

L. pneumophila can colonize buildings and persist over
multiple years (24–26). Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that water isolates collected in 2016 were probably representative of strains colonizing building water systems over
the previous months or even years.
Our study provides reasonable evidence that plumbing
served by the Flint drinking water system was colonized by
strains of L. pneumophila capable of causing Legionnaires’
disease, particularly serogroup 1 and ST1. Although no
epidemiologic links have been made between clinical cases
and cooling tower exposures in these outbreaks, direct or
indirect use of tap water (e.g., via feed to cooling towers) is
possible. High degrees of similarity (2–1,062 SNPs) were
noted between the ST1 isolates of clinical and water origin,
a finding that was consistent with phylogenetic and average
nucleotide identity analysis (Appendix 1 Figures 1–3; Appendix 2). The highest degree of similarity between clinical
and water isolates was between C3 and RH08 (38 SNPs),
HH25 (40 SNPs), HH17 (45 SNPs), and HH56 (46 SNPs).
C2 differed from water isolates by 1,053–1,062 SNPs, and

C7 differed from water isolates by 1,041–1,049 SNPs.
With the exception of 1 isolate (WH03), isolates obtained
from tap water from buildings never served by the Flint
River were markedly distinct from those originating from
residences or hospitals in Flint as well as the clinical isolates. The low number of SNPs between replicate genomes
sequenced in this study (0–10) suggests that the extent to
which technical variation in whole-genome sequencing
contributed to observed sequence variation is low. Previous
studies have documented that although some Legionnaires’
disease outbreaks are characterized by L. pneumophila
clinical strains that differ by as few as <5 SNPs, other outbreaks may differ by as many as 418 core SNPs (27). Thus,
the SNP variability between water and clinical strains of
ST1 in this study, particularly C3, is comparable to the documented range of variation in other outbreaks. In contrast,
clinical strain C2 varied from the Paris reference strain by
only 505, C3 by 371, and C7 by 491 SNPs. Therefore, ascertaining what level of SNP divergence between strains
is demonstrative of a common source or virulent strain is
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challenging. Given the well-established pathogenicity of
the Paris strain, the results are also suggestive of genomic
similarity among virulent strains of Legionella. Regardless,
the similarity between C3 and strains isolated from Flint
tap water samples (38–46 SNPs) is notable.
ST1 water isolates were collected from taps of a hospital and a residence, indicating that this ST seems to have
been somewhat widespread in the water distribution system,
spanning multiple Flint buildings. However, the presence
of several distinct phylogenetic clades of L. pneumophila
isolated from Flint water systems further demonstrates that
a single strain of L. pneumophila did not dominate the system citywide. We hypothesize that this finding is likely the
result of conditions favorable to Legionella growth, which
we previously documented in the Flint system (7), facilitating the proliferation of multiple strains of L. pneumophila
in different buildings and parts of the system. Similarly, the
broad distribution of clinical isolates across 7 STs supports
the hypothesis that any waterborne exposures that resulted
in Legionnaires’ disease could hypothetically have originated from a diverse array of L. pneumophila strains and
exposure sources.
All clinical isolates characterized in this study belonged to L. pneumophila serogroup 1, which is identified
as the cause of >57% of reported Legionnaires’ cases in the
United States (6). ST1 (belonging to serogroup 1) has been
widely implicated in Legionnaires’ outbreaks worldwide,
including outbreaks in France (28), China (29), Germany
(30), Canada (31), and the United States (32). In the United
States, ST1 is thought to be both the most common cause
of sporadic Legionnaires’ disease cases and the most common waterborne ST found in potable and nonpotable water
(32). ST1 isolates are highly conserved at the nucleotide
level (33), making it challenging to link clinical cases with
environmental sources because of the prevalence of ST1
and lack of genetic variability.
Water isolates belonging to serogroup 6, all classified
as ST2518, were widespread in samples collected from a
Flint hospital in March 2016. A study of L. pneumophila
isolates collected from Flint tap water in September and
October 2016 also found that serogroup 6 isolates were
widespread in residential premise plumbing water samples,
although these isolates all belonged to STs 367 and 461
(34). Byrne and colleagues found that serogroup 6 strains
were at least as infectious for macrophages as a known
virulent laboratory strain, emphasizing the potential for Legionnaires’ disease to be caused by strains other than serogroup 1 (34), although more research is needed to confirm
the relevance of serogroup 6 strains for human infectivity.
In our study, none of the clinical strains available for analysis were serogroup 6.
It is noteworthy that 19% of hot water and 12% of cold
water taps were positive for culturable L. pneumophila.
2018

Although L. pneumophila typically multiplies at 25°C–
37°C (35) and prospers in hot water plumbing systems (36),
it has also been widely documented in cold water taps; one
molecular analysis–based study found that as many as 47%
of surveyed cold water taps were positive for genes specific
to L. pneumophila serogroup 1 (37).
When MDHHS recently conducted an epidemiologic
characterization of the Genesee County Legionnaires’ disease cases recorded in 2014 and 2015, although a lack of
clinical isolates hampered a comprehensive investigation,
they found that exposures that occurred at 1 Flint hospital
potentially explained most cases (1–3). Our study provides
complementary whole-genome sequencing–based characterization of clinical isolates and tap water L. pneumophila
isolates collected after the Flint outbreaks. Notably, we
found a high degree of similarity between 4 water isolates
originating from Flint tap water and 3 regional clinical
strains known to cause Legionnaires’ disease. Our study
also established that a variety of L. pneumophila strains
were culturable from Flint tap water and that they tended
to cluster genetically by residence versus hospital origin.
Likewise, we found notable diversity among clinical strains,
spanning 7 STs. Thus, multiple L. pneumophila strains
were associated with the Flint 2014–2015 Legionnaires’
outbreaks, potentially resulting from multiple sources of
exposure, although further epidemiologic investigation is
needed to identify whether multiple sources were involved
and whether there were any common sources of exposure.
Although we did not intend for this study to provide an epidemiologic analysis of precise sources of Legionella exposure for Legionnaires’ patients, our publicly available data
could support such studies in the future.
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